THE FETUS AS A LEGAL ENTITYFACING REALITY
"The life of the law has not been logic:
it has been experience."
Mr. Justice Holmes*

Robert Keeler and his wife obtained an interlocutory decree of
divorce in September 1968. In February 1969, after learning that
his wife was pregnant by another man, Mr. Keeler intercepted her
on a mountain road and, with the words, "I'm going to stomp it out
of you,"-1 assaulted her, delivering blows to the face and abdomen.
A Caesarean section and examination in utero revealed the fetus
had died of a severely fractured skull and resultant hemorrhaging.
Fetal movements had been observed prior to the assault. The fetus
was judged to have been in approximately its thirty-fifth week of
2
gestation.
An information was filed charging Mr. Keeler with murder.8 A
petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent his prosecution for that
crime was denied by the California Court of Appeal for the Third
District. 4 On Appeal to the California Supreme Court, held, writ
granted: a fetus neither born nor in the process of being born is
not a "human being" within the meaning of those words as they appear in the homicide statute. 5 Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d
619, 470 P.2d 622, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970).
INTRODUCTION
Both the act in Keeler and the act in any abortion are directed
* HoLMEs, TE ComMoN LAw, Lecture 1, at 1 (1881).
1. Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 623, 470 P.2d 617, 618, 87
Cal. Rptr. 481, 482 (1970).
2. The fetus was estimated to have a 75 to 96 percent chance of survival if it had been prematurely born at this time. Id. at 624, 470 P.2d at
619, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
3. Two other counts were also filed against petitioner. Count two was
for willful infliction of traumatic injury upon his wife which carries a
maximum sentence of ten years in prison. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273 (d)
(West 1970). Count three was for assault by means of force likely to
produce great bodily harm, which carries a maximum punishment of
$5,000 and/or ten years in prison. CAL. PENAL CODE § 245 (a) (West 1970).
4. 276 Adv. Cal. App. 324, 80 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1969).
5. "Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought." CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1970).
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toward the intentional destruction of a fetus. While the Keeler
type act is morally reprehensible, abortion is being increasingly accepted as a routine, legal, procedure. It is the writer's contention
that this dichotomy must be squarely faced before attempting a
legislative remedy to the immediate Keeler problem. This comment
will examine the basis for the Keeler decision, the abortion dilemma
which must be recognized if legislative reaction to the case is to be
successful, and some considerations for the future.

I. THE CASE
A.

The Court of Appeal

The court of appeal unanimously denied the writ of prohibition.
The court found that the "born alive ' 6 doctrine of England had
never been crystallized into California law.7 The conditions of
modern life, especially the progress of medical science, were seen as
significant in the determination of the present state of the law.8
Two California cases, Scott v. McPheeters9 and People v. Chavez,10
formed the basis of that opinion.
McPheeters was a civil case which held that a child born alive
could recover for pre-natal injuries. At issue was the construction
of section 29 of the California Civil Code. 1 It was decided that the
"interests" of an unborn child included the right to maintain an action in tort for pre-natal injuries. The court admitted that at common law the child had no legal existence distinguishable from that
of its mother. However the court was not bound by this fact because section 29 represented a statutory abrogation of the former
law. The concept that a viable fetus should be considered an existing human being was expounded upon.' 2
6. See text accompanying note 14, infra.
7. 276 Adv. Cal. App. at 327, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
8. Id.
9. 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939).
10. 77 Cal. App. 2d 621, 176 P.2d 92 (1947).
11. "A child conceived, but not yet born, is to be deemed an existing
person, so far as may be necessary for its interests in the event of subsequent birth .

.

.." CAL. CIV. CODE § 29 (West 1954).

12. McPheeters is of course clearly distinguishable from Keeler. It was
a civil case and the child was born alive. It does, however, illustrate a
way of thinking about the viable fetus as a human being. "It is common
knowledge that when a child's lungs and organs are fully developed, even
in a seven-months baby, it is frequently capable of living and that it ac-

In Chavez, a manslaughter conviction was upheld even though
the child may have been killed before it was completely expelled
from its mother's body, i.e., it was not necessary to prove complete
separation. 1 3 The court in Chavez also admitted that at common
law a fetus could not be the subject of homicide until it had been
completely separated from its mother and had an entirely independent life, with the umbilical cord cut and with its own breathing
and heart action. 14 However, common sense recognition of medical
progress required that a child in the process of birth should be included in the definition of a human being.';
The court of appeal in Keeler saw Chavez as an "instrumentality
in the evolutionary development of California homicide law."'u
Thus, even though the common law was codified by the 1850 California homicide statute, the court of appeal felt it was still possible
to adapt the law to modern times without legislative action. Furthermore, according to the court, the Chavez decision had not foreclosed the possibility that a fetus not yet in the process of birth
could also be found to be human.
B. The CaliforniaSupreme Court
Reversing the court of appeal, the supreme court's approach was
to first determine the common law at the time of the enactment of
the California homicide statute in 1850. Relying upon historical
studies, the court concluded that an infant, at common law, could
1
not be the subject of criminal homicide unless it was born alive.
The court quoted the 17th century writings of Coke:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise
killeth it in her wombe, or if a man beat her, whereby the childe
dyeth in her body, and she is delivered of dead childe, this is a
tually exists as a human being separate and distinct from its mother, even
though it is prematurely born by artificial means or by accident. Who
may say that such a viable child is not in fact a human being in actual
existence?" 33 Cal. App. 2d at 634, 92 P.2d at 682 (dictum). Federal
cases can also be found replete with language supporting the concept of the
viable fetus as a human being. E.g., Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp.
220 (S.D. W. Va. 1969) (wrongful death); Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138
(D.D.C. 1946) (tort action for pre-natal injuries--overturned Holmes
doctrine that the fetus was only a part of its mother). A state case of
special interest is Raleigh-Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964) (blood
transfusion ordered to save life of fetus). But for the abortion phenomenon such cases indicate that the fetus might have emerged as a human
being in the full sense of the words.
13. 77 Cal. App. 2d at 626, 176 P.2d at 94.
14. Id.
15. See, id. at 625-26, 176 P.2d at 94.
16. 276 Adv. Cal. App. at 327, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
17. 2 Cal. 3d at 625, 470 P.2d at 620, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
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great misprison [i.e., misdemeanor], and no murder; but if the
childe be born alive and dyeth of the potion, battery, or other cause,
this is murder .... 18

The supreme court also found that the requirement of complete
separation of the child from its mother, before it could be the subject of murder, had been incorporated into American law.' 9
Having concluded that the nineteenth century law in California
required a live birth, the court proceeded to answer the prosecution's contention that progress in medical science and the associated
increase in the survivability of the fetus should result in a change
to that law. Two basic obstacles to such a change were found by
the court.
The first obstacle was jurisdictional. 20 Since there are no common law crimes in California,2 ' the legislature must define an act
as criminal before the judicial system can act upon it. Under the
doctrine of separation of powers, the court could not encroach upon
the legislative function.
The second obstacle was the constitutional due process requirement of notice. 2 2 It was found that petitioner could not have foreseen that his actions could have constituted criminal homicide
against the fetus. Only one California case, People v. Chavez, dealt
specifically with this area, viz., the criminal aspects of the killing of
a fetus not yet completely separate from its mother. 23 The supreme
court in Keeler approved the Chavez concept that a fetus in the
process of birth is a human being within the homicide statutes, but
decided that it was not foreseeable to petitioner that a fetus which
had not yet begun the birth process would also be found to be human.

18. Id.

19. Id. at 627, 470 P.2d at 621, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 485. However, as pointed
out by the dissenting opinion, at common law the killing of a quickened
fetus, though not murder or manslaughter, was severely punished. Id. at
640-41, 470 P.2d at 631, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 495.

20. Id. at 631, 470 P.2d at 624, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
21. CAL. PENAL CODE § 6 (West 1970).
22. 2 Cal. 3d at 633, 470 P.2d at 626, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 490.

23. An example of the fetus being indirectly protected by the criminal
law is the case of People v. Sianes, 134 Cal. App. 355, 25 P.2d 487 (1933),
where it was held that a father could be found guilty of a misdemeanor
for failure to support his unborn child.

C. Significance of the Case
On its face, Keeler is simply an exercise in statutory construction.
On closer analysis, however, it is much more. It is a vehicle for the
presentation to the California legislature of a difficult problem:
How can the intentional destruction of a fetus (under certain circumstances) be discouraged by the penal law in an era of increasing
acceptance of the practice of abortion? If the legislative reaction is
to be successful, it must be realistic.
An unborn child is treated legally in various ways, depending on
what "interest" is being protected. 24 If born alive, an individual
may discover that during the fetal state he has taken and lost property,25 been bound by a court decree,20 and acquired the right to
bring an action for pre-natal injuries. 2 7 If the individual subsequently dies, then a wrongful death suit may be brought on the
28
basis of the pre-natal injuries.

To these examples of the "legal existence" of the fetus, can be
added what may be a generally held belief that a Keeler type act,
especially in the case of a viable child, is extremely serious. 2 Even
before Keeler, the conflict was apparent between the civil law treatment (generally protective) of the unborn child and the abortion
trend. Keeler, because it concerns the intentional destruction of a
viable fetus under distressing circumstances, has brought the conflict to a point where it must be recognized.
24. For a general discussion of the rights of the fetus in property and

tort see Noonan, The Constitutionality of the Regulation of Abortion, 21
HASTMGs L.J. 51 (1969); Louisell, Abortion, the Practice of Medicine and
the Due Processof Law, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 233 (1969).
25. E.g., In re Sankey's Estate, 199 Cal. 391, 249 P. 517 (1926).
26. Id. See also CAL. PROB. CODE § 250 (West 1956), "A posthumous
child is considered living at the death of the parent."; CAL. PRon. CODE
§ 123 (West 1956) provides, "A child conceived before but born after a testator's death ... takes, if answering to the description of the class."
27. Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939).
28. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 377 (West 1954), provides for the maintenance of an action for damages for the death of a "minor person" by his
heirs or personal representatives. It was held in Norman v. Murphy,
124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954), that the child must be born alive,
i.e., a fetus is not a "minor person." Some states do not require a live birth
as a prerequisite to a wrongful death action. E.g., Panagopolous v. Martin,
295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D. W. Va. 1969). Del Tufo, Recovery for Pre-Natal
Torts: Actions for Wrongful Death, 15 RUTGERS L. R.v. 61 (1960).
29. See text accompanying note 44, infra. Also supporting the idea

that there is a general consensus about the seriousness of the act is the

rapid reaction of the legislature to the case. See note 43, infra. It should
be remembered that the liberalization of the practice of abortion has not
resulted directly from a lack of benevolent feelings toward the unborn
child, but rather from the "discovery" of a barrier of privacy around
the mother that prevents the interference with her choice to terminate the
pregnancy. See text accompanying notes 33 and 37, infra..
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II.

THE ABORTION SITUATION

California abortion law,30 substantially liberalized in 1967,31 permits an abortion during the first twenty weeks of pregnancy, upon
approval of a hospital committee. The committee must find that
the continuation of gestation would either gravely impair the physical or mental health of the mother or that the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest. California Health and Safety Code Section
25951 defines mental health as mental illness to the extent that the
woman is dangerous to herself or property, or is in need of supervision or restraint. Evidently, to many persons desiring an abortion,
even the diminished restrictions of the 1967 statute are unacceptable. As a result, in some areas abortions are available on demand.

32

30. CAL. HALTH & SAF=r CODE §§ 25950-54 (West Supp. 1970).
31. Prior to 1967, abortion was permitted only when necessary to save the
life of the mother. Ch. 99, § 45, 1850 Cal. Stats. 233. With the enactment
of the 1967 statute § 274 of the penal code was amended to provide for the
punishment of abortion only when the requirements of §§ 25950-54 were
not complied with.
32. See Moyers, Abortion Laws: A Study in Social Change, 7 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 237 (1970).
Advocates of the unrestricted practice of abortion characteristically display a casual attitude about the rights of the fetus. The head in the sand
device of emphasizing that most abortions are performed early in the pregnancy is evidently expected to soothe opponents of their views who are
particularly disturbed about late terminations. E.g., People v. Belous, 71
Adv. Cal. at 1010, 458 P.2d at 202, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 362 ("during first trimester"); see Clark, supra note 36; Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and Administration of State Abortion Statutes,
46 N.C. L. REV. 730 (1968) ("early post-conception, entity not unlike separate male spermatazoon and female ovum").
Advocates of the rights of the unborn child often emphasize the characteristics of the fetus toward the end of the gestation period. E.g., Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D. W. Va. 1969); People v. Chavez,
77 Cal. App. 2d 621, 176 P.2d 92 (1947); Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d
629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939); Louisell, Abortion, The Practice of Medicine and
the Due Process of Law, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. (1969).
These polar points of emphasis might have been, in a more stable era,
the basis for a compromise, i.e., abortion would be legal at the earliest
stages of the pregnancy, but absolutely prohibited at the later stages. The
1967 California statute (see text accompanying note 31, infra) permitting
abortions through the twentieth week is typical of such attempted compromise. However Babbitz v. McCann (see text accompanying note 37, infra)
indicates that there can be no restriction on abortion at least until the
fetus has quickened. Furthermore, the language in Babbitz is strong
enough to indicate that the post-quickened child may also be unprotected.

Because of the vagueness of its wording, the pre-1967 California
abortion statute was held in violation of the federal constitution
in People v. Belous.33 The Belous court decided that a woman has a
constitutional right to decide, without interference from the state,
whether to carry her child until birth. The vagueness of the words
"necessary to preserve"3 4 and the derivative reluctance of doctors
to perform abortions because of their fear of prosecution resulted
in an effective denial to the woman of the enjoyment of her right.
The court found no compelling interest in protecting the life of the
fetus that could justify an interference with the mother's right to
privacy. Great emphasis was placed on medical progress, but the
effect of that progress was to make abortion a safe practice for the
mother (thereby eliminating an obstacle to its practice) rather than
to elevate the "humanness" of the fetus (by increasing its survability). The "rights" of the fetus were dispatched in a few short
paragraphs.
The Belous court drew support for its decision from Griswold v.
Connecticut 5 wherein a state statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives between married persons was held unconstitutional as an
infringement upon the right to marital privacy, a right found
within the penumbra of the specific guarantees of the Bill of
36
Rights.
Indications are that federal courts will follow Belous and thereby
eliminate any chance for reversal of the trend toward unrestricted
abortion. In Babbitz v. McCann,37 a federal district court issued a
declaratory judgment that the Wisconsin abortion statute 8 was
unconstitutional because it interfered with a woman's ninth amend33. 71 Adv. Cal. 996, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969). The Belous
decision was handed down on September 5, 1969. The words in Belous
to the effect that the destruction of a fetus was never murder were considered dicta.
34. See note 31, supra.
35. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
36. Id. at 484-85. The view of the Belous court that the marital privacy right to practice contraception must lead to the right to practice abortion is shared by Retired Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark. See
Clark, Religion, Morality, and Abortion: A ConstitutionalAppraisal,2 LoyOLA OF L.A. L. REv.1 (1969).
37. 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970), appeal dismissed per curiam
McMann v. Babbitz (U.S. Oct. 12, 1970) (No. 297). See also United
States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969), appeal docketed, 38
U.S.L.W. 3373 (U.S. Feb. 5, 1970) (No. 1155).
38. Wis. Cpal. CoDE § 940.04 (West 1958). The statute distinguished
between abortion of a fetus before and after quickening. The court was
concerned only with application of the pre-quickened section. The statute
declared that an unborn child is a "human being" from the time of conception.
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ment 39 right to privacy. The court said:
An examination of recent Supreme Court pronouncements regarding the ninth amendment compels our conclusion that the state
...

may not... deprive a woman of her private decision whether

to bear her unquickened child.40
When measured against the claimed "rights" of an embryo of four
months or less, we hold that the mother's right transcends that of
such an embryo.
We ... conclude ... that the mother's interests are superior to

those of an unquickened embryo, whether the embryo is mere
protoplasm, as the plaintiff41 contended, or a human being, as the
Wisconsin statute declared.

III. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
The supreme court in Keeler primarily based its decision on the
fact that under the common law a fetus could not be the subject of
criminal homicide, a doctrine incorporated into California law by
the 1850 enactment of the homicide statute.42 The legislature has
responded to the case by simply amending sections 187 (murder)
and 192 (manslaughter) of the penal code to provide that the words
"human being" include a fetus. The sections are not to apply if the
killing of the fetus is done in compliance with the Therapeutic Abortion Act, by a doctor when necessary to preserve the life of the
mother, or with the consent of the mother.43 Thus the legislature
has failed to face the dilemma posed by the contemporaneous liberalization of abortion.
A.

The dilemma

Keeler requires a determination of the way in which an unborn
child is to be treated legally. A dilemma arises if one attempts to
formulate a statute that would make the killing of a fetus, under

certain circumstances, a crime against it (as distinguished from a
39. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CoNsT.
AMEND. IX.

40. 310 F. Supp. at 299.
41. Id. at 301.

42. See text accompanying note 19, supra.
43. The amendments have been signed by the governor, and will become effective November 25, 1970.

crime against the mother). The supreme court in Keeler said that
the killing of a viable fetus under such circumstances would be
4
deemed by some to be of a similar nature and gravity to murder.
But what difference can it make to the fetus whether the knife be
that of a madman or a surgeon? How can it be a serious crime, let
alone murder, for one person to kill a fetus and yet completely acceptable for a woman and her doctor to do the same act, with perhaps an identical motive?4 5
The pre-1967 abortion statute,4 6 which required the mother's life
to be in real danger, at least made the killing of the fetus analogous
to justifiable homicide. The current "standards" of good health and
comfort as justification for the destruction of the fetus lead to the
conclusion that the unborn child is not legally "human" at all.
Since the interest of the fetus in life cannot compete with its mother's interest in comfort, and since the right to live must be the
greatest right of all, it follows that the fetus is in reality a legal nonentity. The civil law treatment4 7 must merely represent a legislative conferment of benefits to children for pre-natal injuries and
property transactions. The question is, disregarding the mother,
can the killing of a fetus, per se, be a criminal act? The answer is
no. The legally sanctioned, unrestricted practice of abortion is irreconcilable with a statute that would permit a fetus to be the subject of criminal homicide.
B. A Realistic Statute
By failing to face the reality of current events concerning abortion, the legislative response of amendment to the criminal homicide
statute is unsatisfactory for two reasons. The first reason, as previously discussed, is that it is logically unsound to approach the problem from the standpoint of the fetus, to approve the action of the
mother in killing it, and yet label the similar action of another the
most heinous of crimes-murder.
The second reason is that the amendment may be unconstitutional. Recall the discussion of Beious. 48

The abortion statute was

unconstitutional because the fear by doctors of prosecution under it
resulted in an interference with the woman's right to exercise a free
44. 2 Cal. 3d at 632, 470 P.2d at 625, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
45. Since a posthumous child has certain property rights (see note 26,
supra) an abortion could be profitable for the mother, e.g., the case of

intestate succession where there are no living children at the time of the
father's death.
46. See note 31, supra.
47. See notes 11, 12, 24, 26, and 28, supra.
48. See text accompanying note 33, supra.
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choice regarding whether she should bear a child. The chilling effect of facing the possibility of prosecution for murder need not be
49
elaborated upon.
Since it is not logical and may be unconstitutional to attempt a
solution to the immediate Keeler problem (preventing similar acts)
by direct legal protection of the fetus, a more appropriate response
by the California legislature would be the enactment of a statute
providing greater protection for a woman known to be pregnant.
There are at least two elements of her condition that justify such a
special assault and battery provision: 50 (1) her greater vulnerability to serious physical harm; and (2) the possession by her of a parental expectation. The vulnerability element is of course dependent
on the stage of the pregnancy, and this particular aspect of the problem could be handled by provision for greater punishment for an
attack upon the woman after a certain period of gestation.

IV. FuTuiE PROSPECTS
The dissent in Keeler, criticizing the majority decision which left
the viable fetus without the protection of the homicide statute,
commented upon the great effort currently made to extend life. 51
This criticism serves well to illustrate the choice we have made.
Certainly it is not logical to preserve life near its end when there is
no hope for regained health, and yet to allow indiscriminate destruction of life at its earliest and most promising stages. In addition, the elderly are sometimes kept alive against their own wishes
while in the case of abortion the child cannot, and the father will
not, 52 be heard.
49. The provisions in the amendments to the criminal homicide statutes
that they are not to apply if the woman consented to the killing of the
fetus, mitigate this effect somewhat. This codification of the woman's
power to determine whether the same act is murder, manslaughter, or
merely the exercise of a right to privacy, indicates a recognition of (but
hardly a solution of) the inherent problem in protecting the unborn child
in a society that has legally accepted abortion.
50. Similar special assault provisions have already been enacted in another area. CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(a) (West 1970), provides a maximum
punishment of ten years in prison and/or a $5000.00 fine for assault likely
to produce great bodily harm. § 245(b) increases the punishment for
assault on a peace officer or fireman to fifteen years in prison or five
years to life if there has been a prior felony conviction.
51.

2 Cal. 3d at 642-43, 470 P.2d at 633, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 496.

52. In California (and most other states) the husband's consent is not

The remarkably rapid acceptance of abortion suggests that the
very concept of life needs re-examination. The fetus cannot be
protected because the barrier of privacy of the mother cannot be
penetrated. Why then can it be protected once it has begun the
process of birth? Why is the interest of the state suddenly sufficient to overcome the woman's right to privacy? Why is the viable
fetus not protected when, as a result of an abortion, it is removed
alive? 53 In that situation, the mother's rights are no longer relevant.
Is it too distasteful to consider a more practical time, such as one
year after conception, to give legal definition to the child? At least
this would allow a more informed selection. Many of the arguments in support of unrestricted abortion apply equally well to a
child (or any other helpless person) of any age.5 4 It is true that
after birth there is not the obstacle of the woman's privacy to prevent the protection of the living child. But it is foreseeable that in
the future the fetus will be removed from its mother to complete
its development in a (perhaps) superior environment. Certainly
when this operation becomes commonplace there will not be a sudden throwing back of the point at which one becomes legally human to the time of removal. On the contrary, the current point of
defining humanness at time of (or process of) birth will become
completely meaningless. The problem will then be that of deciding
at what point this living thing can no longer legally be destroyed. 55
required by the abortion statute. In the one case on the subject, the Su-

preme Court of California affirmed (without comment) a superior court's
rejection of a father's claim that an abortion without his consent was a
denial without due process of his right to have his child born. O'Beirne
v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 1 Civil 25174 (Sup. Ct. of Cal.,
Dec. 7, 1967). Case discussed in Means, The Law of New York Concerning
Abortion and the Status of the Foetus, 1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of
Constitutionality,14 N.Y.L.F. 411, 430 (1968).
53. Whatever the percentage of abortions that result in a live delivery,
the occurance of even a small number of such births presents a serious
legal and moral problem. Of course the problem is realistically not distinguishable from that of abortion of a viable fetus while it is still within
its mother. But the physical and legal absence of the mother demands
that the problem be faced.
Bureaucratic procedures may be a cause for abortions occurring late in
the pregnancy. In Sweden, twenty-four week old babies sometimes "cry
for hours before dying." TIME MAGAZNE, Oct. 13, 1967 at 32. The moral
dilemma is illustrated by the report that at the George Washington University clinic some nurses have been baptizing fetuses. And the parents
are given a choice; they may have the fetus buried in the conventional
manner or incinerated as waste. NATIONAL REvIEw, June 30, 1970, at 659.
54. It should be noted, however, that these arguments (such as personal
comfort, economic convenience, etc.) were not the basis for the legalization
of abortion. See text accompanying notes 33 and 37, supra.
55. That problem is, to a degree, existant today. See note 52, supra.
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The constitutional rights of the mother will not aid in that decision.
Loins E. BOYLE

It has been reported that a London abortion clinic was experimenting in
keeping fetuses alive and was also selling them for research. NEWSWEEx
MAGA ZNE, June 1, 1970 at 86.

